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Abstract
As the driving force of crowdsourcing is the interaction
among participants, various incentive mechanisms have been
proposed to attract sufficient participants. However, the ex-
isting works assume that all the providers always meet the
deadline and the task value accordingly remains constant. To
bridge the gap of such impractical assumption, we model the
heterogeneous punctuality behavior of providers and the task
value depreciation of requesters. Based on those models, we
propose an Expected Social Welfare Maximizing (ESWM)
mechanism that aims to maximize the expected social wel-
fare in polynomial time. Simulation results show that our
heuristic-based mechanism achieves higher expected social
welfare and platform utility via attracting more participants.
Introduction
The existing incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing as-
sume that all the providers always meet the deadline of
requested tasks. In practice, however, we cannot guaran-
tee such perfect punctuality. Therefore, the existing mecha-
nisms, despite their well-defined system models, do not fully
reflect the realistic behavior of providers.
Besides, without guaranteeing the perfect punctuality,
there can be task value depreciation if tasks are completed
after the deadline. Typically, a requester can achieve a full
task valuation if its requested task is completed within the
deadline. Otherwise, the later task is completed, the less
valuation it achieves (Yeo and Buyya 2005). In addition,
the rate of depreciation can be different among participants.
Therefore, due to such potential task value depreciation, the
existing works may not accurately estimate task valuation in
crowdsourcing system.
In addition, such task value depreciation can affect the
payment policy in incentive mechanisms. In the existing
works, providers are rewarded with a fixed payment policy.
However, when tasks are deadline-sensitive, the valuation of
tasks depreciates after the deadline or even become value-
less, which will inflict loss of utility to requesters. Despite
such loss, they are not accounted for their loss. As a result,
the satisfaction level of requesters will degrade.
Therefore, we model the providers’ punctuality behavior
and the task value depreciation to build an incentive mecha-
nism under more practical and realistic assumptions. Based
on our new system model, we propose an expected social
welfare maximizing (ESWM) mechanism that aims to max-
imize the expected social welfare in polynomial time.
Related Works
Yang et al. (Yang et al. 2012) presented two models of incen-
tive mechanisms: platform-centric model and user-centric
model to motivate mobile users’ participation. By reward-
ing participants proportionally to their contribution, D. Peng
et al. (Peng, Wu, and Chen 2015) proposed a quality based
incentive mechanism for crowdsensing. To maintain suffi-
cient participants and promote dropped users to participate
again, Lee and Hoh (Lee and Hoh 2010) propose a mech-
anism, called RADP-VPC, to provider long-term incentives
to participants.
Expected Social Welfare Maximizing Problem
The objective of the platform is to find the optimal requester-
provider matches L that maximize the expected social wel-
fare as formulated below
L∗ = argmax
L
∑
rj∈R
∑
wi∈W
(Ei(vj(t))− ci)lji, (1)
subject to ∑
rj∈R
xj ≤ K, (11.a)
∑
rj∈R
xj =
∑
rj∈R
∑
wi∈W
lji =
∑
wi∈W
yi, (11.b)
xj ∈ {0, 1}, ∀rj ∈ R, (11.c)
yi ∈ {0, 1}, ∀wi ∈W, (11.d)
lji ∈ {0, 1}, ∀lji ∈ L. (11.e)
where rj (R) and wi (W ) denote a requester (a set of re-
questers) and a provider (a set of providers), respectively.
rj wants to complete a task with certain deadline, of which
valuation is vj . wi wants to work on a requested task and
get rewarded for the task to compensate the incurred cost,
ci. Ei(vj(t)) is the expected task valuation of a task from
rj when completed by wi. lji indicates that rj and wi are
matched together. xj and yi indicate whether rj and wi are
selected or not. Constraint (11.a) specifies that the platform
has a limited capacity to handle K task requests and con-
straint (11.b) specifies that each selected requester will be
matched to only one provider. To obtain the optimal solution
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Figure 1: Benchmark VS ESWM
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Figure 2: Benchmark VS ESWM with reselection
in (1), we need to solve a binary integer programming prob-
lem, which is NP-complete. Thus, to overcome such imprac-
ticality, we propose an expected social welfare maximizing
mechanism (ESWM) that is based on a greedy algorithm to
heuristically obtain the locally optimal solution.
Performance Evaluation
As performance metrics, we consider the naı¨ve social wel-
fare (NSW) to simply sum the task valuation and the ex-
pected social welfare (ESW), the platform utility, and the
average utility of requesters and providers. We compare
the performance metrics of our mechanism to those of the
benchmark (Zhang et al. 2015) whose winner selection pro-
cess is based on the greedy algorithm, but only considering
the platform utility.
In reality, as all the participants are rationally selfish, they
are likely to select the mechanism that provides higher util-
ity to them. Thus, when both the benchmark and our mech-
anism exist in a crowdsourcing system, the number of par-
ticipants that each mechanism attracts can vary depending
on the average utility each mechanism provides. To reflect
such difference of attractiveness between two mechanisms
to participants, we set the participation probability of a par-
ticipant proportional to the square root of the average util-
ity of participants in Figure 1 where both mechanisms are
given the same number of requesters and providers, based
on (Akerlof 1982). According to the probabilities, each par-
ticipant decides which mechanism it will participate in. We
call such decision making process reselection. Figure 2a and
Figure 2b show that the ESWM mechanism achieves higher
social welfare and platform utility than the benchmark. Such
outperformance can be achieved as the ESWM mechanism
can attract more participants, which increase the chance of
getting better providers. Figure 2c and Figure 2d show that
the ESWM mechanism and the benchmark achieve almost
the same average utility as long as both can handle task re-
quests. This is because the increased number of requesters
and providers participating in the ESWM mechanism ironi-
cally decreases the average utility of participants. Based on
our observation from Figure 2c and Figure 2d, we can antic-
ipate that there will not be a significant increase in the num-
ber of reselection again as the benchmark and the ESWM
mechanism reached the balance point of the average utility
of participants. In addition, the ESWM mechanism can sup-
port more task requests.
Conclusion
In this work, we proposed an Expected Social Welfare Max-
imizing (ESWM) mechanism that is based on a greedy al-
gorithm to heuristically obtain the locally optimum in poly-
nomial time. Simulation results show that the ESWM mech-
anism achieves higher expected social welfare and platform
utility than those of the benchmark mechanism via attracting
more participants.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by the Ministry of Science, ICT
and Future Planning (MSIP), Korea, under the ICT Con-
silience Creative Program (reference number IITP-2015-
R0346-15-1007) supervised by the Institute for Information
and Communications Technology Promotion (IITP).
References
[Akerlof 1982] Akerlof, G. A. 1982. Labor contracts as partial gift
exchange. The quarterly journal of economics 97(4):543–569.
[Lee and Hoh 2010] Lee, J.-S., and Hoh, B. 2010. Dynamic pric-
ing incentive for participatory sensing. Pervasive Mob. Comput.
6(6):693–708.
[Liu et al. 2011] Liu, C.; Hui, P.; Branch, J.; Bisdikian, C.; and
Yang, B. 2011. Efficient network management for context-aware
participatory sensing. In Sensor, Mesh and Ad Hoc Communica-
tions and Networks (SECON), 2011 8th Annual IEEE Communica-
tions Society Conference on, 116–124.
[Peng, Wu, and Chen 2015] Peng, D.; Wu, F.; and Chen, G. 2015.
Pay as how well you do: A quality based incentive mechanism for
crowdsensing. In Proceedings of the 16th ACM International Sym-
posium on Mobile Ad Hoc Networking and Computing, MobiHoc
’15, 177–186. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
[Yang et al. 2012] Yang, D.; Xue, G.; Fang, X.; and Tang, J. 2012.
Crowdsourcing to smartphones: Incentive mechanism design for
mobile phone sensing. In Proceedings of the 18th Annual Inter-
national Conference on Mobile Computing and Networking, Mo-
bicom ’12, 173–184.
[Yeo and Buyya 2005] Yeo, C. S., and Buyya, R. 2005. Service
level agreement based allocation of cluster resources: Handling
penalty to enhance utility. In 2005 IEEE International Conference
on Cluster Computing, 1–10.
[Zhang et al. 2015] Zhang, X.; Xue, G.; Yu, R.; Yang, D.; and Tang,
J. 2015. Truthful incentive mechanisms for crowdsourcing. In
Computer Communications (INFOCOM), 2015 IEEE Conference
on, 2830–2838.
